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During the 1990s, scholars of intelligence in the United States and Great Britain, 
especially intelligence historians, have benefited from significant releases of declassified 
records. In the United States, recent works on intelligence owe much to the government's 
own willingness to declassify the operational records of the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) and early CIA files. Outside organizations like the National Security Archive and 
the Cold War International History Project have also pushed government agencies to 
declassify material. In Great Britain, declassification is more restricted, but researchers 
there have been at work over the last four years with the Special Operations Executive 
(SOE) collection. On both sides of the Atlantic, however, historians of World War II and 
Cold War have oriented most of their work on Europe. In June 1999, the University of 
Nottingham's Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies sponsored a conference on the 
"Clandestine Cold War in Asia" to rectify this deficiency. Papers from this conference 
have been brought together in The Clandestine Cold War in Asia: 1945-1965. It 
represents a sample of the cutting-edge in Cold War intelligence history.  
The editors of Clandestine Cold War, Richard Aldrich, Gary Rawnsley and Ming-Yeh 
Rawnsley, are colleagues at the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies and, separately, have 
published widely on issues of wartime/Cold War intelligence, psychological warfare and 
radio propaganda in the Near and Far East. In a deft introduction to Clandestine Cold 
War, they assert that to appreciate the "hotness" of the Cold War in Asia, especially its 
clandestine aspects, researchers must dig below the superpower conflict and reach into 
the cauldron of local nationalisms and the effects of decolonization. They also address the 
clash of policies between Western powers in Asia . the United States' interest in 
promoting a postwar liberal world order often collided with the interests of former 
colonial powers like Great Britain and France. Finally and refreshingly, in this reviewer's 
opinion, Aldrich and the Rawnsleys focus on the interaction between intelligence, 
propaganda and special operations as instruments of state policy.  
Clandestine Cold War is divided into three parts: China and the Chinese perimeter, 
Southeast Asia and the Malayan Emergency. Eleven authors have contributed to the 
volume, but as with many edited works, the quality of the articles is mixed. Most are 
examples of solid historical work that carefully combine either substantial archival work 
or the latest from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series supplemented 
by a range of secondary sources. In terms of readability, only two of the articles are 
heavily filled with acronyms and organizational charts. Matthew Aid's study of American 
intelligence prior to and during the Korean conflict, as well as Philip Davies' 
administrative outline of the British Special Intelligence Service's (SIS) Singapore 
station, required careful reading and frequent returns to the book's Abbreviations. The 
articles in the first part work well in tandem to provide a clearer picture of the 
intelligence war along China's Pacific "Rimland," while each of the third part's articles 
should be required reading for anyone delving deeply into the British counterinsurgency 
campaign in Malaya.  
Unfortunately, such cohesion is not reflected among the articles in the middle part on 
Southeast Asia. Before faulting the editors, this criticism could actually back one of their 
claims - the region is ethnically and politically complex. It is perhaps futile to expect 
complete clarity on a multifaceted region from only five contributions. That said, the 
articles in the second part are of a much broader chronological range and the styles of the 
articles are quite mixed as well. Rather than straight intelligence histories, the second part 
gives examples of foreign policy tracing, managerial analysis and even literary criticism. 
While varied research methods and writing styles can be positive in an edited work, Eva-
Lotta Hedman's discussion of former Filipino president Ramon Magsaysay in light of 
symbolism in American fiction might have been better applied to a work of cultural 
studies. Her article stands out awkwardly against the other traditional histories in 
Clandestine Cold War. All-in-all, this reviewer thought that the book's first and third 
parts were the academic equivalent of going for a brisk swim in the source material while 
the section on Southeast Asia felt more like dipping one's foot in the water.  
Each section had one or two very strong contributions. Aid's study is a stinging 
indictment of the American intelligence organization in the Korean War. He effectively 
demonstrates the divisiveness between civilian and military intelligence, as well as intra-
service bickering. US intelligence was plagued by poor leadership and poor liaison with 
South Korean intelligence, in addition to a lack of area knowledge and linguistic training. 
These circumstances stunted accurate evaluation of the North Korean threat. In the same 
section, Johannes Lombardo documents the difficulties that arose between the United 
States and Great Britain over the US Consulate's support of anti-communist dissident 
groups in Hong Kong. Both Lombardo and Gary Rawnsley allude to the constraints that 
politics and alliance relations can place on executing effective psychological and political 
warfare. Current students of offensive information warfare will also find Lombardo's 
work helpful, especially as he outlines the use of the United States Information Service 
(USIS) in "information operations" against the communist mainland.  
In the second part, Mona Bitar gives a detailed assessment of US-French-Cambodian 
foreign (and covert) relations in the late 1950s. Scholars interested in what intelligence 
operators do with their skills following the dissolution of their organizations will want to 
pay close attention to Richard Aldrich's work on former SOE members involved in the 
Karen struggle in Burma after World War II. Aldrich's article should open up further 
research on cooperation and competition between the private and public sectors in the 
area of foreign policy. Finally, in the third section, readers have been given a forum to 
compare and contrast the dominant traditions of Malayan Emergency historiography. The 
analyses by Karl Hack and Brian Stewart should be read together - Hack tries to 
synthesize the "British" and "communist" accounts of the Emergency, while Stewart, a 
participant in Malaya, gives a first-hand rendition of the use of intelligence as an 
instrument of counterinsurgency.  
One significant reservation against purchasing Clandestine Cold War, however, is the 
fact that the publisher previously released the articles in the Winter 1999 issue of their 
quarterly journal Intelligence and National Security. If one has access to the Frank Cass 
journal, the book becomes immediately superfluous. Overlooking that criticism, The 
Clandestine War in Asia introduces new and uncharted areas of historical research. It is 
an excellent follow-through to recent works focusing on the Asian theater during World 
War II, such as Maochun Yu's OSS in China, Bernard Wasserstein's The Secret War in 
Shanghai and Aldrich's own Intelligence and the War Against Japan. And if one wishes 
to have all of the articles in an easy-to-access format, Clandestine War would be a good 
purchase.  
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